In this study, we examine the network of a business group, and attempt to understand how other member firms are influenced when one member makes strategic alliances with partners outside of the business group, using a Taiwanese sample. The evidence suggests that the focal firms experience significantly positive stock market reactions to strategic alliance announcements, and that the other member firms in the business group also experience, on average, positive abnormal returns. The results further indicate that the abnormal returns of member firms are significantly and positively associated with pyramidal group structures, and when the alliance partners are located in unrelated industries.
INTRODUCTION
A business group is a set of legally independent firms that are established under the same control and ownership. The group members not only sustain independent firm objectives, but they also act to meet the shared goals of the business group as a whole. Business groups make up a type of interfirm network, usually linked by equity holdings and director interlocks (Numazaki, 1986) , and are usually held by a dominant family (Luo & Chung, 2005) . The ties enable member firms to coordinate their actions in product markets or the markets for inputs. Consequently, business groups establish a network in which member firms share risks and recourses. Therefore, the performance of a member may directly affect other member firms in the same business group. Leff (1978) interpreted a business group as a substitute to market imperfections. Business groups are argued to be able to appropriate quasi-rent through access to scarce and imperfectlymarketed resources such as financial capital and information. They also can reduce the transaction costs caused by a bilateral monopoly or oligopoly through vertical integration within the groups. It is reported by Khanna and Palepu (2000) that group member firms typically outperform independent firms and enjoy diversification premium. Khanna and Rivkin (2001) also indicate that the profitability of group member firms are higher than independent firms in emerging economies, and within-group returns are more similar to one another than those outside the group.
Individual member firms, however, do not have equal access to group resources for operation performance due to differences in ownership structure and power asymmetry. Although considerable researches have been done to understand the importance and influence of business groups, little attention has been directed to answer the intra-group wealth effect of the member firms.
In this study, we attempt to investigate the effect of intra business group by studying network expansion. Specifically, we examine the wealth effect on the group member firms when the focal firm announces strategic alliances with partners outside of a business group. It is shown that firms may benefit not just from their direct ties in a network, but also those created by the connections of the actors to whom a firm is directly linked (Gulati, 1999; Gargiulo & Benassi ,1999) . Furthermore, due to the different characteristics of member firms within the business group, the intra group effect of alliance network expansion should be heterogeneous among the member firms.
We measure wealth effect by sharing price reactions to strategic alliances announcements. A sample of strategic alliances made by firms belonging to business groups in Taiwan is collected over the period of [1997] [1998] [1999] [2000] [2001] [2002] [2003] [2004] [2005] [2006] [2007] [2008] . The sample includes 107 announcing firms and 279 member firms involved in 100 domestic strategic alliances. Business groups in Taiwan demonstrate a rich variety of network ties by economic and social ties including investment structure, equity holdings, and director interlocks (Numazaki, 1986) . Taiwan also offers clear definitions of group membership. It is the heterogeneity of intragroup ties coupled with the clarity of group boundaries that makes groups in Taiwan attractive for examining how various types of intragroup ties affect abnormal returns gaining differently.
The results of our analyses suggest that shareholders of member firms realize significant positive gains when a focal member announces strategic alliances with partners outside the group. Further, the abnormal returns of member firms are greater when the business groups are more centralized.
Despite the positive effect on member firms, we find the wealth effect of individual member firms greatly vary within the business group. The abnormal returns are greater when the member firm and outside alliance partner are located in different industries. The finding also implies that member firms experience a larger share price impact when they have greater cross-ownership with the focal member firm. Finally, the evidence indicates that member firms with lower growth opportunity benefit more from group network extension created by allying with outside partners.
The remainder of this paper is organized as follows. Section II provides the theoretical background and hypotheses development. Section III describes the sample and empirical methodology. The results are presented in section IV, and the conclusions are made in Section V.
BACKGROUND AND HYPOTHESES

Network embeddedness and alliances
Networks are clusters of enterprise organizations composed of special units formed from market functions rather than official organizational formats (Miles & Snow, 1992) . It is described by Hakansson and Johanson (1988) that business networks are unique structures combining activities and resources in specific formats.
Alliances create value through exchange, sharing, codevelopment, transfer of know-how between firms that exist of persistent firm-specific differences in the ability. Strategic alliances are distinctive in that each member constitutes a strategic action, and their cumulation can also form a social network. The firms joining alliances regard social networks as bestowing firms with "social capital" which can become an important basis for competitive advantage (Burt, 1997) .
The existing partners of a firm may refer other firms to it form alliances or to join the three-way partnerships (e.g. indirect ties). A firm may have multiple potential partners offering various opportunities for value creation, and competitive threats focus attention on particular -85303 -opportunities that rivals are exploiting (Greve, 1998) . By exploring the partner of a network to join a new alliance which is to think of network expansion, we provide insights into the expansion of networks beneficial to other firms of the network.
McPherson (1983) argued that competitive relations exist when firms seek for the same limited resources or target the same markets or customers. Park and Russo (1996) found that alliances among direct competitors (e.g. firms from the same four-digit SIC code) were more likely to fail.
Aside from the effects of direct competition, the indirect competitive effect of third parties may influence alliance formation. Silverman and Baum (2002) claimed that a firm may be negatively affected by its rivals' alliances and networks. When the focal firm announces new alliance, the member firms in previous alliance can be regard as potential partners, which creates intranetwork competition since the firm and its rivals would become substitute partners within the network.
Intranetwork competition undermines the member firms' unique advantage and power to appropriate rents from the relationships.
Business groups as networks
Business group can be defined as a long-term association of a great diversity and legally independent firms, taking diversification across industries, that are linked as a network in some formal and/or informal ways (Granovetter, 1995; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Chang et al, 2006) . Member firms are linked by formal economic arrangements such as cross-stockholding, interlocking directorates, mutual loan, internal transaction, and joint subsidiary, as well as by informal ties based on family, friendship, religion, language, and ethnicity (Gerlach, 1992; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Chung & Luo, 2008) . These ties' multiplicity and institutionalization distinguish business groups from short-term strategic alliances.
The firms seek to overcome market imperfection in emerging economy by banding together into diversified business groups. A combination of resource-based and transaction-cost arguments suggests that business groups can provide capital, labor, material and technology information, allowing internal transaction more efficiently (Chang & Choi, 1988; Khanna & Palepu, 1997 .
A business alliance is an "ongoing cooperative agreement between two or more independent corporation to achieve common goals" (Sheth & Parvatiyar, 1992) . Through the platform of group network, other member firms may be regarded as potential partners obtaining tacit skills and knowledge that are important for keeping competitive in the rapidly changing markets from -85304 -their partners outside the business group (Greve, 1998) . Based on the resource-based view that the benefits of member firms are associated with their superior access to a richer pool of opportunities, we propose the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 1: The group network aids to the stock market reactions of member firms when the focal member announces strategic alliances.
Alliances can be regarded as network expansion. When the focal company announces an alliance, the member firms in the business group are potential partners, which offer various opportunities and technical exchange for value creation since they would become complementary partners within the network.
On the other hand, when the alliance partners and the group member firms are located in related industries, the shareholders will have impression that the products of the member firm are short of competitive advantage. In this way, when both participants and member firms are located in different industries, and thus can offer different information for value creation, and the stock market should react more positively.
Hypothesis 2: When the partnering and member firms are located in unrelated industries, the stock market reactions of member firms will be more positive when the focal member announces strategic alliances.    Although the macro perspectives provide premium for unrelated diversification, little attention has been paid to all member firms to enjoy the same benefits. The power-dependent perspective offers an appealing angle. Business groups entail governance and internal market benefits, and it is unlikely that these advantages accrue to all the member firms on an even basis. Consequently, the members in the organized commercial system likely to obtain different types and levels of rewards due to differentiated power levels within their group.
In this study, we consider two types of intra group structures commonly found among group member: (1) mother-child types and (2) mating type. Then, our expected relationships of group structures are specified, and highlight how different types of structure will have differential wealth effects on member firms.
The mother-child type of group structure in which member firms receive most of the capital from core company which also holds a large proportion of shares of member firm and dominate -85305 -member firms and creates strong group identity (Miyashita & Russell, 1994 ).
The mother-child type of group structure is defined as vertical investment structure that possesses stronger power in a group would have more influence on benefit appropriation. Korean chaebol is a typical representative of this group structure. In a Korean study, Korean chaebol is extremely stable and the investment centralized within a single family or small number of allied families. Moreover, chaebol firms are under the comprehensive and centralized management and financial control of the family patriarch who are managed by centralized command instead of consensus (Orrù et al, 1997; Smångs, 2006) .
Another group structure is the mating type in which member firms are reinvested by the core company and member firms. Business groups are quite loose coalitions of firms in which no single firm or individual firm holds controlling interests in others.
Business groups in Japan possess the characteristics of the mating type. The structure of keiretsu arises from stable corporate cross-ownerships, economic resource dependencies on transactions with the members of a group, and the transfer or dispatch of managers to insider director positions-the keiretsu presidents' council is a regularly convening association of the president of the member firms. The keiretsu is as a loose and voluntary association that represents and supports the identity of the group as a whole, but involves itself sparingly in the decision-making of individual companies (Lincoln et al, 1996) . The keiretsu effects on corporate profitability have a negative interaction between group affiliation and prior performance that connotes redistribution: weaker firms do better, but stronger firms do worse (Lincoln et al, 1996 ).
The mother-child type of investment structure makes group structure more central in which core company has large controlling power to member firms for making operational decision to maximize the interests of business group. Base on the arguments set out above, we present the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 3: The centrality of group structure in a business group is positively associated with the stock market reactions of member firms to the alliance announcements of the focal firm.
Because the external capital market is inefficient in emerging economies (Khanna & Palepu, 1997) , group member firms greatly rely on the intragroup capital market to develop new products and services (Mahmood & Mitchell, 2004) . Cross-ownership between member firms is a function of characteristics of the dyad that is the role of relational capital between members as -85306 -a means of both enhancing cooperative behavior and mitigating competitive conflicts.
To the extent that cross-ownership helps firms insulate themselves from the pressure of short-term profit volatility and distress, managers are able to make continuous investment in and transfers of organization skills, routines, and systems, which raises the likelihood of improved operating performance (Mahmood et al, 2011) . Therefore, we present the following hypothesis.
Hypothesis 4: The cross-ownership rate between member firm and the focal member in business group is positively associated with the stock market reactions of member firms to the alliance announcements of focal firm.
Complementarities in the wealth effect of member firm
Abnormal return is a response of collective activity. While Hypothesis 2 emphasizes how partnering and member firms from unrelated industries can provide capabilities and information to raise member firms' value, other group structure containing cohesion and strengthened relationships may also facilitate the acquisition of abnormal return.
Most business groups are family owned and managed by members of the founding family and trusted friends (Hamilton & Kao, 1990; Luo & Chung, 2005) . The group structure is the centrality that has the higher controlling power between member firms (Peng, 2004) to pursuit of common goals and enable group member firms connect with institutions from unrelated industries.
In this way, member firms connected by centrality of group structure have a higher likelihood of engaging in joint alliances with complementary businesses. Therefore, the advantage of partnering with firms in unrelated industries can be more fully realized when accompanied by this particular group structure. This iterative, mutually reinforcing process between unrelated industry and the centrality of group structure lead to our next hypothesis.
Hypothesis 5: The centrality of group structure reinforces the positively moderated relationship between partnering and member firms that are located in unrelated industries and the stock market reactions of member firms to the alliance announcement of the focal firm.
Another complementarity that can enhance the wealth effect of member firm was provided by partners from unrelated industries of alliances which are greater access to intragroup financial -85307 -capital. Cross-ownership gives more controlling power to member firms, and this is particularly conducive to the exploitation of strategic information transmitted from outside institution. In this regard, cross-ownership makes an important contribution to the accumulation of competitive advantages. Therefore, the internal capital market within a business group may work as a de facto venture capitalist and allocate financial resources for group development (Chang et al, 2006) . Therefore, we propose our final hypothesis:
Hypothesis 6: The greater cross-ownership rate reinforces the positively moderated relationship between partnering and member firms that are located in unrelated industries and the stock market reactions of member firms to the alliance announcement of the focal firm.
SAMPLE AND EMPIRICAL METHODOLOGY Sample design
We obtain our initial sample of strategic alliance from Commercial Times, Economic Daily To be included in the final sample, the alliances must meet the following criteria:
1. The business group data source is the Business Groups in Taiwan (BGT) directory, compiled by the China Credit Information Service (CCIS) in Taipei. This directory collects information on the top 100 groups (in terms of annual sales) whose core firms are registered in Taiwan.
This directory is the most comprehensive and reliable source for business groups in Taiwan.
This source has been used for several previous studies are according to this source (Claessens et al, 2000; Khanna & Rivkin, 2001; Mahmood et al, 2011) . Therefore, we collected data of group structure and cross-ownership by reading each group in the BGT directory which also provided the list of names of directors for each member firm.
2. To investigate the abnormal returns for group members, there must be daily stock price information that is available from the Taiwan Economic Journal (TEJ) Data Bank so that profitability can be discontinuously calculated.
-85308 -3. At least one member of the strategic alliance must be a business group and at least two members of group must be listed on the board of the Taiwan Stock Exchange.
4. If the alliance event involves two or more business groups, then it belongs to two or more samples.
5.When the announcement of an alliance is found in different publications, the announcement with the earliest date is chosen.
6. Because our study focuses on nonequity strategic alliances, we exclude alliances involving equity investments, such as joint venture and sharing the right of control.
7. To avoid any confounding events that could affect the measurement of the wealth effects, the partnering firms must not have made any other announcements in five days before and after the initial announcement date.
Sample characteristics
Following these selection criteria, our final sample is composed of 107 announcing firms and 279 member firms involved in 100 domestic strategic alliances. Panel A in TableⅠpresents the sample distribution by calendar year. The largest number of announcements of strategic alliances in one year is 14 in 1997 and 1999, followed by 11 in 2000. The largest number of strategic alliance announcements involves technical agreements (55%) including licensing, development of research technology transfer or systems integration and manufacturing agreements, followed by marketing and distribution agreement (35%). Panel B reports the group structure of the groups according to the directory Business Groups in Taiwan (BGT). 107 announcing firms in our sample are located in 22 business groups. The groups are divided into mother-child type (49.5%) and mating type (50.5%) group structures.
Empirical methodology
We use standard event study methodology to examine stock price responses to focal and member firms on the announcement of an alliance. This involves implementing the following procedure for each focal or member firm for each alliance event:
(i) Use daily data on the stock market returns of each listed firm in the data base over a 240-day -85309 -period prior to the event day (Brown & Warner, 1985) to estimate the following market model (Fama, 1976 
Where it r denotes the daily returns for firms i on day t , mt r represents the corresponding daily returns on the value-weighted Taiwan Stock Exchange All-share Index, i α and i β are firm-specific parameters, and it ε is independent and identically distributed.
(ii) Use the estimated coefficients ( i α and i β ) from this model to predict the daily returns for each firm i over the "event window" surrounding the alliance announcement:
Where it r ∧ denotes the predicted daily return for firm i on day t . 
Independent variables
Group structures have an important influence on control power to member firms. Owners with large investment of capital in the business give them a strong motivation to continuously control member firms to ensure that they not only emphasize short-term returns but also long-term objectives. We collect information of group structure for each group from the Business Groups in Taiwan (BGT) directory. The group structure dummy equals one if the group has a mother-child type structure, and zero otherwise.
The focal-member cross-ownership is based on the mutual shareholding ratio between the two listed companies in the same group. Taking advantage of the internal capital market composed of cross-ownership between group members, which makes firms more likely to succeed in -85310 -developing new products and pursuing maximizing the interests of the group.
The bus.-unrelated member-partner dummy equals one if the member and partnering firms in a different alliance have a different two-digit SIC code, and zero otherwise. An alliance structure and broader operations as network expansion of group that potentially creates greater opportunities for both market coordination and resource accumulation would result in positive response.
Control variables
We include four member firm-level variables to capture other influences exerted by member firms on the abnormal return. Tobin's Q member denotes the ratio of the market-to-book value of the firm's assets, where the market value of assets equals the book value of assets minus that of common equity, and plus the market value of common equity. Tobin's Q has been widely used to distinguish firms with good investment opportunities from those with poor ones to capture the relative undervaluation of firms. ROA member denotes the annual member firm return on assets prior to alliance announcements. Successful past performance provides sufficient resources for firms to develop new competitive capabilities. Firm size member equals the natural logarithm of book value of assets of the member firm for fiscal year prior to announcement. Prior research also suggests that firm size can affect the cumulative abnormal returns experienced. The streams of resource coming from new partner would thus be more valuable to small firms (Chaney et al, 1991) .
To the extent that firms within a group may share certain common group-specific attributions, we include several group-level variables that address groups-level influences on abnormal return of member firms. Core dummy equals one if the focal firm is the core company in the group, and zero otherwise. Core company may determine to maximize their wealth by alliance to obtain the bulk of valuable resources to the member firms in which they hold the largest ownership share.
AR focal uses two-day (0, 1) announcement-period abnormal returns. Member firms are tied together by various relationships to share knowledge and resources to collectively enhance performances. Direct tie dummy denotes one if there is the same director between the two listed companies in the same groups, and zero otherwise. Interlocking director ties among business group affiliates tend to provide richer and more credible information about operation practices primarily due to the higher level of trust.
-85311 - The sample statistics of explanatory variables in this study are provided in Panel C. Our sample shows significant heterogeneity in abnormal return across firms, with the mean abnormal return at 0.34 and median abnormal return at 0.02. positively correlated with Tobin's Q member , group structure, focal-member cross-ownership and with direct tie, and significantly negatively correlated with firm size member and with ROA member , all at the 1% level.
ESTIMATION AND RESULTS
Empirical results
Consistent with prior researches (e.g., Koh & Venkatraman, 1991; Madhavan & Prescott, 1995; Anand & Khanna, 2000) , we find that alliance participants indeed experience positive and significant mean abnormal returns only on the announcement day (0.34%, two-tailed, p<0.08). The average cumulative abnormal return from day 0 to 1 was 0.65%, statistically significant at the 1% level using a two tailed test. For the two-day event window, there are more than 55% of the sample announcements with positive cumulative abnormal return.
We now turn to the heart of our analysis: the effect of alliance announcements on member firms of the focal. The evidence on stock market reactions indicated that the member firms experienced a significant mean abnormal return only on the next day of announcement (0.24%, two-tailed, p<0.06) and after two days (0.22%, two-tailed, p<0.07). For the two-day (from day 0 to 1) announcement period, the shareholders of member firms experience a significantly positive average abnormal return of 0.34%, statistically significant at the 6% level using a two tailed test and 51% of the sample announce effects are positive. This result suggests that network effects create strong and favourable changes in shareholder wealth of member firms. Hypothesis 1 is supported.
Cross-sectional regression analysis
A multivariate analysis incorporates the interaction between these variables and captures the overall effect of the distinguishable characteristics that affect the wealth effect of the member firms in an alliance. To further examine the effects of these factors, we estimate a multivariate cross-sectional regression of the announcement-period abnormal returns for the member firms. All regressions are estimated using weighted least squares, with the weights equal the reciprocal of the standard deviation of the market-model residual. This procedure is used to obtain efficient estimates, since the variances of the market-model residuals vary across announcers (Lang et al, 1991) . Table Ⅱ presents the results of the cross-sectional regression analysis of the announcement-period abnormal stock market reactions for the sample of member firms.
Model 1 serves as a baseline model that includes all the potential explanatory variables. The abnormal returns of member firms are greater when the member firm and outside alliances partner are located in different industries. Further, the abnormal returns of member firms are greater when the group structures are more centralized to have tight control of a firm. Finally, the evidence indicates that member firms experience a larger share price impact when they have greater cross-ownership with the focal member firm. Therefore, Hypothesis 2, 3, and 4 are supported.
Among the control variables, only AR focal and Tobin's Q member were found to have a significant explanatory power for our sample. The focal firm's abnormal returns (AR focal ) are significantly more positive market reactions to member firms. Member firms with lower growth opportunity benefit more from group network extension created by allying with outside partners.
Hypothesis 5 posits that group structure maintained is likely to be more valuable when the member and partnering firms are located in different industries. To test this hypothesis, we introduce the interaction term between group structure and bus.-unrelated member-partner dummy in model 2. The interaction term takes on a positive sign and is statistically significant (P < .10), suggesting that Hypothesis 5 is supported. However, Model 3 tests Hypothesis 6, which shows that focal-member cross-ownership is less beneficial when the member firm and outside alliance partner are located in different industries.
We include two interactions that group structure and focal-member cross-ownership with bus.-unrelated member-partner dummy separately in Model 4. The coefficient of the interaction term of group structure and bus.-unrelated member-partner is positive and statistically significant (P < .10). But the coefficient of the interaction term of focal-member cross-ownership and bus.-unrelated member-partner is weaker. The results remained consistently to those presented above. 
CONCLUSION
We began by noting that firms affiliated with business groups in emerging economies differ in their stock market reactions and widely connected to each other through a variety of group structures. Drawing on network literature about innovative capabilities, we proposed that one way to explain the variation in abnormal return of member firms is to eschew the traditional view of network ties as generic conduits for information and resource exchange between firms, and to instead consider how a focus on different types of group structures can more accurately explain the extent to which an member firm can gain abnormal return through network ties with other group members.
Using Taiwan's business groups as a research sample, the evidence suggest that while the focal firms experience significantly positive stock market reactions to strategic alliance announcements, other member firms in the business group on average also experienced positive abnormal returns. Despite the positive effect on member firms, we find the wealth effect of individual member firms greatly vary within the business group. Specifically, we argue and find that the more centralized business group structure would lead to better wealth impact of member firm. The centralization of a business group with high controlling power which facilitates knowledge transfer and cooperation among member firms was particularly more able to earn benefits than those without such powers. Moreover, we found that group structure combined synergistically with outside alliance partners are located in unrelated industries, that is, when group structure was coupled with diversification through other member firm announcing alliance, the wealth effect of group structure was even stronger.
By offering a theoretical and empirical analysis of how different types of ownership ties influence the abnormal return of member firms, we see our integrative study as having implications for three separate streams of prior research, specifically, abnormal return, business group, and alliance networks. While we do challenge the implicit assumption that firms are autonomous and atomistic in their pursuit of the maximum interests. This atomistic approach, with its focus on the properties of firms, ignores the importance of the network in which firms are embedded (McEvily & Zaheer, 1999; Gulati et al, 2000) . Our research redresses this imbalance by highlighting the significance of network ties in the development of economic performance.
Focusing on the variation in abnormal return of member firms, our research by highlighting how and why some network structures among group firms can serve as conduits form accessing external resources. In other words, the heterogeneity in abnormal returns of member firms can be accounted for not only by operating performance, but also by variation in the network expansion of vertical integration when the focal firm announces strategic alliances with outside partners.
Finally, we find that mother-child type provides advantages on shareholder benefits, whereas some do not. Business groups have positive effect on the acquisition of competitive advantages in the sense that they facilitate resource sharing and information exchange among member firms, which is hard to achieve via market systems in emerging economies (Khanna & Palepu, 2000) .
Our findings suggest that firms that intend to earn larger abnormal returns should consider strengthening inter-firm cooperation and establishing ties to external institutions with the goal of connecting to resources. Thus the general implications are not limited to Taiwanese firms, but can also be extended to firms in other regions in the world.
